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Abstract  
Humans spontaneously attribute a wide range of traits to strangers based solely on their facial 
features. These first impressions are known to exert striking effects on our choices and 
behaviours. In this paper, we provide a theoretical account of the origins of these spontaneous 
trait inferences. We describe a novel framework (‘Trait Inference Mapping’) in which trait 
inferences are products of mappings between locations in ‘face space’ and ‘trait space’.  
These mappings are acquired during ontogeny and allow excitation of face representations to 
propagate automatically to associated trait representations. This conceptualization provides a 
framework within which the relative contribution of ontogenetic experience and genetic 
inheritance can be considered. Contrary to many existing ideas about the origins of trait 
inferences, we propose only a limited role for innate mechanisms and natural selection. 
Instead, our model explains inter-observer consistency by appealing to cultural learning and 
physiological responses that facilitate or ‘canalise’ particular face-trait mappings. Our TIM 
framework has both theoretical and substantive implications, and can be extended to trait 
inferences from non-facial cues to provide a unified account of first impressions. 
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1. Introduction 
Humans spontaneously attribute a wide variety of traits to strangers based solely on their 
facial appearance. These first impressions include judgements about trustworthiness, honesty, 
competence, intelligence, dominance, and likeability (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; 
Sutherland et al., 2013; Todorov, 2017; Todorov, Olivola, Dotsch, & Mende-Siedlecki, 2015; 
Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). These judgements are formed quickly and exert a striking 
influence over our behavior (Olivola, Funk, & Todorov, 2014). For example, spontaneous 
impressions from faces are thought to affect employment opportunities (Olivola, Eubanks, & 
Lovelace, 2014), voting patterns (Ballew & Todorov, 2007), and sentencing decisions (Funk 
& Todorov, 2013; Wilson & Rule, 2015). Previous research has done much to elucidate the 
cues on which these judgements are based and to describe their social consequences (Olivola, 
Funk et al., 2014; Todorov et al., 2015; Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008).  
 
In the present paper, we consider where these spontaneous trait inferences come from and 
present a novel theoretical account of their origins: Trait Inference Mapping (TIM). We 
propose that spontaneous trait inferences can be understood as mappings between locations in 
‘face space’ and locations in ‘trait space’. This conceptualization provides a framework 
within which the relative contribution of ontogenetic experience and genetic inheritance can 
be considered. First, we contend that face space and trait space – requisites for face-trait 
mappings – are themselves subject to considerable environmental control.  In other words, 
our face perception ability and our knowledge of other people’s traits are both shaped by 
experience. We go on to assert that facial representations become associated with particular 
traits as a consequence of correlated face-trait experience. This learning may be heavily 
influenced by cultural factors including systematic differences in the ways in which 
individuals with different character traits are depicted in literature, film and other forms of 
media. Innate physiological responses play a limited and specific role in our model whereby 
they facilitate or ‘canalize’ (Waddington, 1942) the emergence of particular face-trait 
mappings. Before outlining our argument in detail, we briefly review the literature on 
spontaneous first impressions (for comprehensive reviews see: Olivola, Funk et al., 2014; 
Todorov, 2017; Todorov et al., 2015; Todorov et al., 2008). We then consider existing ideas 
about the origins of spontaneous trait judgements, before presenting our framework and 
discussing its theoretical and substantive implications.  
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2. Making trait inferences from faces 
When viewing photographs of unfamiliar faces, adults spontaneously attribute a range of 
characteristics to the person depicted. While a wealth of spontaneous judgements have been 
studied, many first impressions appear to load on two principal dimensions often described as 
‘trustworthiness’ and ‘dominance’ (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2013). 
Adults make stable trait judgements when faces are viewed for only 100 ms (Willis & 
Todorov, 2006), and inter-rater agreement is above chance when faces are presented for only 
33 ms (Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009). Developmental research has shown that by 
the age of 3, children are capable of making explicit judgements about how ‘nice’ and 
‘strong’ a person appears to be (Cogsdill, Todorov, Spelke, & Banaji, 2014). Indeed, from 7 
months of age, infants preferentially orient towards faces deemed trustworthy by adults rather 
than those deemed untrustworthy (Jessen & Grossmann, 2016). Interestingly, although some 
first impressions may be based on ‘a kernel of truth’ (Bonnefon, Hopfensitz, & De Neys, 
2015), others appear unrelated to the true behavioural tendencies of the people being judged 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov et al., 2008). 
 
Figure-1 
 
Considerable research has sought to identify the facial cues on which observers base trait 
inferences. Permanent facial features which resemble subtle facial emotions may provoke 
inferences in line with those provoked by the corresponding emotional expression 
(Montepare & Dobish, 2003; Said, Sebe, & Todorov, 2009). For example, lower eyebrows, a 
common feature of facial displays of anger, may cause an individual with naturally low 
eyebrows to be perceived as dominant (Keating, Mazur, & Segall, 1981). Faces with infantile 
features are often judged to be trustworthy (Zebrowitz, 2004; Zebrowitz, Franklin, & 
Boshyan, 2015; Zebrowitz & Zhang, 2011). Attractive faces, associated with facial 
symmetry, averageness, and sexual dimorphism (Rhodes, 2006; Thornhill & Gangestad, 
1999), elicit positive evaluation on a number of dimensions, including competence and 
trustworthiness (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972; Talamas, Mavor, & Perrett, 2016; 
Verhulst, Lodge, & Lavine, 2010; Wilson & Eckel, 2006). Masculine features increase 
judgements of dominance when judging male faces (Batres, Re, & Perrett, 2015; Swaddle & 
Reierson, 2002). Facial adiposity (fatty tissue) affects perceived leadership ability (Re & 
Perrett, 2014). Eye-lid openness and mouth curvature influence perceived intelligence 
(Talamas, Mavor, Axelsson, Sundelin, & Perrett, 2016) and males with wider faces may be 
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perceived as more dominant and less trustworthy (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Valentine, Li, 
Penke, & Perrett, 2014). This list, while not exhaustive, illustrates the range of cues and 
attributions that have been studied.  
 
3. Previous accounts of the origins of trait inferences 
To date, there has been a dearth of detailed discussion of the origins of trait inferences.  
Within this embryonic literature, theorising has tended to fall back on evolutionary 
explanations. Judgements of trustworthiness are thought to have emerged from a selection 
pressure to distinguish friends from foe (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Zebrowitz, 2004; 
Zebrowitz & Zhang, 2011) and judgements of dominance are thought to have emerged from a 
need to distinguish potential leaders from followers (Van Vugt & Grabo, 2015). In both 
cases, however, it has been suggested that the ability to make trait judgements conferred an 
advantage on our ancestors; spontaneous impressions were important for survival and 
successful social interaction in our evolutionary past. As a result, the cognitive mechanisms 
for making trait judgements are often characterised as inherited products of gene-based 
natural selection. Such evolutionary explanations have overshadowed potential learning 
accounts. Authors have typically ascribed a limited role to learning, citing environmental 
factors as a potential source of idiosyncratic differences between observers’ trait inferences 
(Todorov, 2017).   
 
Claims of innateness have been justified in a number of different ways.  Zebrowitz and Zhang 
(2011) argue that the speed and automaticity of trait judgements demands a nativist 
explanation. However, this logic does not withstand scrutiny. Speed and automaticity alone 
do not provide strong evidence for innateness. For example the classic Stroop Effect 
demonstrates that reading – a prototypical example of a learned skill – occurs quickly and 
automatically (Stroop, 1935). Other researchers have pointed to the fact that trait inferences 
appear early in development (Cogsdill et al., 2014; Jessen & Grossmann, 2016). However, 
manifestation early in development alone need not imply a strong innate basis either.  
Consider, for example, that newborn infants prefer to hear their native language over a 
foreign language, an effect that must be a product of the environment (Kinzler, Dupoux, & 
Spelke, 2007; Moon, Panneton-Cooper, & Fifer, 1993).  
 
The specific architecture hypothesised by innate accounts has not been articulated and it is 
unclear on which mechanism or process natural selection is thought to have acted. For 
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example, models fail to state clearly which aspects of face perception and personality 
understanding are thought to be innately specified, or how visual inputs come to excite trait 
representations. A strong nativist account – implied in much of the discussion cited above – 
would hold that inferences of the type ‘this person appears trustworthy’ rely on a genetically 
inherited mechanism of some description. To maintain this position would appear to require 
that the two requisite skills underlying spontaneous first impressions from faces - perception 
of faces and understanding of others’ traits - must also have an innate basis. Although the 
rudiments of these abilities may well be innately specified, development continues 
throughout childhood and beyond.  Any convincing framework for understanding 
spontaneous first impressions must incorporate these developmental trajectories.   
 
4. Trait inference mapping (TIM) 
We propose a Trait Inference Mapping (TIM) framework in which, rather than being viewed 
as judgments in a unitary face-trait space (e.g., Sutherland et al., 2013), trait inferences are 
understood as the products of mappings between locations in two distinct spaces: ‘face space’ 
and ‘trait space’. We argue that these mappings are acquired ontogenetically as a 
consequence of correlated face-trait experience. Mappings allow excitation to spread 
automatically from face representations to trait representations, and thereby give rise to 
spontaneous trait inferences. In the following subsections, we outline the components of our 
model in more detail, first explaining how face space and trait space are both heavily 
influenced by experience. Having outlined evidence for these two claims, we then describe 
how correlated face-trait experience may induce mappings between these spaces.   
 
4.1 Face space 
Face space comprises a multitude of dimensions that each describes a mode of facial 
variation. Together, these dimensions may be thought of as a multidimensional space within 
which the visual system represents the faces it encounters (Rhodes & Leopold, 2011; 
Valentine, 1991; Valentine & Endo, 1992; Webster & MacLeod, 2011). Attributes are 
thought to be represented through opponent coding, whereby loadings on a dimension are 
determined by the relative excitation of two neural populations with complementary receptive 
fields (e.g., Susilo, McKone, & Edwards, 2010). TIM posits a face space in which i) many 
opponent pools exhibit view invariant responses, and ii) transient (expression) and structural 
(face shape) sources of variation are coded by broadly separate dimensions (Calder, Burton, 
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Miller, Young, & Akamatsu, 2001; Calder & Young, 2005). Transient and structural 
dimensions may approximate subspaces that allow identity-invariant description of 
expression and expression-invariant description of facial shape, respectively.  
While we recognise that there may be differences between the visual processing of familiar 
and unfamiliar faces (Burton & Jenkins, 2011; Hancock, Bruce, & Burton, 2000), TIM 
assumes that all faces, both familiar and unfamiliar, are encoded as vectors within a common 
face space. Representations of unfamiliar faces – particularly those depicted in facial 
photographs – may be imperfect, given the inherent ambiguity present when inferring 3D 
structure from a single 2D image (Todd, 2004). However, as observers acquire familiarity 
with a face, the associated vector may become more stable (Burton & Jenkins, 2011; Jenkins 
& Burton, 2011; Murphy, Ipser, Gaigg, & Cook, 2015).  
 
Some aspects of face perception may be present from birth. For example, new born infants 
famously orient to face-like patterns (Johnson, 2005; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 
1991). However, face space is thought to emerge ontogenetically (Rhodes & Leopold, 2011; 
Valentine, 1991; Valentine & Endo, 1992; Webster & MacLeod, 2011). This accords with the 
observation that structural development of the face processing network continues well into 
adulthood (Gomez et al., 2017), and with findings that observers’ face recognition ability 
peaks in their early thirties (Germine, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2011). A popular view, 
inspired by data reduction algorithms (e.g. principal components analysis), is that the visual 
system extracts important modes of variation from the population of faces encountered by the 
individual (Calder & Young, 2005). Where an individual encounters many faces of a 
particular type, the resulting dimensionality may be optimized to describe this variation (Furl, 
Phillips, & O'Toole, 2002). The lack of tailored dimensionality may explain culture-specific 
recognition abilities; for example, why many Western Caucasians experience difficulties 
recognising East Asian faces, and vice versa (Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & de 
Schonen, 2005). 
 
The visual description of a face, captured by its position in face space, represents the input 
into our model. Factors and manipulations that influence how that face is represented in face 
space will therefore directly determine which mappings are activated and consequently which 
trait space representations gain excitation. It has previously been reported that visual illusions 
that alter the appearance of faces – including facial aftereffects (Buckingham et al., 2006; 
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Engell, Todorov, & Haxby, 2010) and the composite face illusion (Todorov, Loehr, & 
Oosterhof, 2010) – also alter the traits that observers infer from those faces. These effects 
likely result from changing the input into the mechanism for deriving trait inferences, rather 
than modulating the mechanism itself. It has also been reported that the traits inferred from a 
particular face can vary depending on the distribution of recently encountered faces (Dotsch, 
Hassin, & Todorov, 2016). We speculate that this may be a conceptually similar example of 
input modulation.  
 
4.2 Trait space 
Our model assumes that conceptual knowledge of others’ traits is accumulated throughout 
development. For the sake of exposition, we refer to this body of knowledge as a ‘trait-
space’. This description accords with the dimensional characterisation of personality and 
intelligence constructs (Digman, 1990; Mackintosh, 1998), and the use of a dimensional 
space to represent the trait variation of others (Conway, Catmur, & Bird, 2017; Fiske, Cuddy, 
& Glick, 2007; Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2013; Todorov et al., 2008). 
We assume that trait space dissociates from observers’ knowledge of, and ability to perceive, 
faces (‘face space’) but we make no claims about the neural instantiation of this knowledge 
space (e.g. whether traits are represented through opponent coding). In our framework, trait 
representations describe stable characteristics of an individual that predict their likely 
responses and behaviours across a range of situations. Crucially, traits are latent constructs 
that must be inferred (e.g. personality, intelligence, abilities and talents), not surface 
attributes (facial identity, gender, ‘babyfaceness’, physical attractiveness) available from a 
superficial analysis of visible features (also see discussion of appearance qualities; e.g.,  
Zebrowitz et al., 2012).  
 
The behaviour of others is frequently unpredictable, ambiguous, and context dependent. 
Identifying latent trait dimensions, and learning to represent others within this 
dimensionality, therefore poses a formidable challenge. In many cases, theory of mind 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978) may be a necessary prerequisite. For example, understanding 
traits like ‘honesty’ requires that individuals first recognise the possibility of deception 
(Sodian, 1991). Even making simple attributions of ‘nice’ and ‘not nice’, often requires some 
understanding of an actor’s intentions, as well as the actual outcome of their actions 
(Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). The 
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acquisition of trait-related vocabulary is also likely to scaffold the development of some trait 
concepts, and vice versa (Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982). For example, learning subtle 
distinctions between traits such as ‘likeable’, ‘trustworthy’ and ‘approachable’ may benefit 
from linguistic constructs. As a result, mature trait concepts may emerge relatively late in 
childhood. Indeed, individuals may continue to develop and refine their unique trait space 
throughout their lifetime.  
 
Nevertheless, rudiments of personality understanding may appear early in development 
(Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). For example, in relation 
to trustworthiness, Hamlin and colleagues (Hamlin et al., 2007) have shown that even in the 
first year of life, infants appear to prefer individuals who are helpful over individuals who 
cause harm.  In relation to dominance, 10- to 13-month-old infants (but not 8-month-old 
infants) expect the larger of two agents to prevail in a conflict (Thomsen, Frankenhuis, 
Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011) (see also Mascaro & Csibra, 2014). In relation to competence, 
14 month old infants prefer to learn from individuals who have been reliable in the past than 
from individuals who have previously been unreliable (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & 
Daum, 2010).   
 
We propose that the emergence of mature trait constructs may be subject to considerable 
environmental influence; that each individual’s trait space reflects their own particular 
developmental experience. For example, individuals raised in challenging social 
environments may develop complex dimensionality for representing the negative traits of 
others and may broadly expect strangers to be untrustworthy (Dodge, 1980). Exposure to 
prototypical characters in fairy tales and children’s stories (Lee et al., 2014), the extent to 
which mothers use trait terms in conversation (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006), as well as 
training in particular social activities such as pretend play (Dockett, 1998) and deception 
(Heyes & Frith, 2014; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) may influence children’s developing 
abilities in this domain.  
 
Evidence that trait space is at least partially under environmental control comes from cross-
cultural research. For example, some rural groups value knowledge relating to plants, 
animals, weather, soils, and diseases, whereas the Western concept of intelligence is abstract 
and less relevant (Reyes-García et al., 2010; Zebrowitz et al., 2012). More generally, there 
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are cultural differences in the extent to which individuals use trait constructs, as opposed to 
inferences about the situation, to explain the behaviour of others. In interdependent cultures, 
traits do not necessarily form the basis of social judgements; rather, individuals within these 
cultures are more likely to focus on situational factors as potential determinants of an 
individual’s actions (Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002).  
 
4.3 Two routes to trait inferences 
Brief inspection of a stranger’s facial features and head shape allows the observer to represent 
the stranger’s face shape in face space. But how do we represent strangers in trait space? We 
speculate that observers can represent individuals in trait space via two routes. Much of the 
existing literature assumes that an ‘automatic route’ is responsible for spontaneous trait 
inferences about unfamiliar faces (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006). The elucidation of this automatic route is the focus of the present article. It is 
important to recognize, however, that trait inferences need not be automatic. In line with dual 
process accounts of the mind more generally (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman, 2003), we 
propose that there must also be a second ‘controlled route’ by which a stranger can be placed 
in trait space via explicit reasoning about their appearance and behaviour.  
 
Explicit reasoning about the likely traits of a newly encountered individual may be based on 
evidence accumulated from various sources. Innumerable behaviours provide clues about the 
traits of others, ranging from complex, protracted displays of altruism or treachery, to ‘thin 
slices’ of behaviour (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992), such as facial expressions. It is often 
possible to directly observe these behaviours (first hand evidence). However, we can also 
learn about strangers’ behaviours from others (second hand evidence). For example, our 
estimation of a stranger’s traits may be informed by the reactions of known others to that 
individual. We can also learn about the previous interactions and behaviours of strangers 
through written or verbal communication (e.g., 'gossip'; Feinberg, Willer, & Schultz, 2014).  
 
While the cognitive processes underlying the controlled and automatic inference of others’ 
traits likely dissociate, the controlled route may play a key role in the development of the 
automatic route. By allowing observers to simultaneously represent an individual’s traits as 
well as their facial appearance, the controlled route ensures that the conditions for associative 
learning are met (see Section 4.4). The two routes may also interact in other ways. For 
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example, explicit reasoning may override activation of automatic face-trait mappings, 
analogous to the way in which top-down control processes can override learned stereotypes 
(Devine, 1989). Similarly, automatic face-trait mappings may bias explicit reasoning about a 
stranger’s traits.  For example, first impressions may sometimes shift the criterion for positive 
evaluation such that people with an untrustworthy appearance need to work harder to be 
considered kind. 
 
4.4 Face-trait mappings 
How might automatic mappings between face space and trait space be formed? Once an 
observer is able to simultaneously represent an individual’s facial appearance in face space 
and some aspect of their character in trait space, a face-trait mapping may be established. 
According to the TIM framework, mappings between points or regions in face space and 
points in trait space are learned through correlated face-trait experience. Several learning 
traditions have converged on the idea that covariation fosters association or grouping (Aslin 
& Newport, 2012; Pearce & Bouton, 2001; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Consistent with this 
view, we propose that face-trait mappings emerge when a predictive relationship 
(contingency) exists between representations in face-space and trait-space. Put simply, when 
one repeatedly encounters individuals with a particular face shape or facial feature who 
subsequently exhibit a particular trait, a mapping forms between the corresponding face and 
trait representations.  Once acquired, these mappings mediate spontaneous trait judgements 
from faces: where the face of a stranger falls close to a mapped location in face space, 
excitation automatically propagates to the associated representation in trait space (Figure 2). 
Individuals may begin to acquire mappings during infancy, before mature face and trait 
representation spaces have developed, and may continue to acquire and refine mappings 
throughout their lives.  
 
Figure-2 
 
The specificity of the mapping may reflect the nature of the face-trait covariation. Specific 
face-trait contingencies between a single facial identity and particular trait signature might 
yield mappings between particular points in face and trait space. Conversely, non-specific 
contingencies between a broadly defined “face type” and a nebulous cluster of traits might 
yield mappings between corresponding regions in face and trait space. The latter may 
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correspond to intergroup judgements where observers acquire mappings between a more 
general group identity and particular traits (e.g., taking the form of stereotypes). In addition, 
we speculate that some mappings may be bidirectional, whereby active trait representations 
can also excite face representations. 
 
5. Evidence for ontogenetic mapping 
Three lines of evidence suggest that face-trait mappings emerge as a result of learning. First, 
lab-based empirical research suggests that, when learning about particular individuals, brief 
periods of face-trait training can affect the inference of traits from faces. Falvello, Vinson, 
Ferrari and Todorov (2015) presented adult participants with unfamiliar faces for 4.5 seconds 
each. These faces were paired with positive (e.g. “Gave his balloon to a child who had let 
hers go”) or negative (e.g. “Stole money and jewellery from the relatives he was living with”) 
behaviours intended to reveal features of the person’s character. At test, participants were 
presented with a subset of these faces without their descriptors and asked how trustworthy 
they appeared to be. Faces that had previously been paired with positive information were 
judged to be more trustworthy. Related to this, we note that adults have been shown to 
generalise information that they have learned about the relative trustworthiness of one 
individual to novel individuals with similar facial appearance (Verosky & Todorov, 2010).   
 
Second, in relation to spontaneous trait inferences about strangers, preliminary cross-cultural 
work suggests some variability in the trait inferences made by different cultural groups (Na & 
Kitayama, 2011; Sofer et al., 2017; Walker, Jiang, Vetter, & Sczesny, 2011; Zebrowitz et al., 
2012). For example, Zebrowitz and colleagues compared the trait inferences made by US 
undergraduates and the culturally-isolated Tsimane people who live in the Bolivian 
Rainforest (Zebrowitz et al., 2012). When rating Caucasian faces for dominance / respect and 
warmth / sociability, the US undergraduates exhibited extremely high inter-rater agreement. 
When judging the same faces, however, the ratings provided by the Tsimane people showed 
little or no consensus and inter-rater agreement failed to reach statistical significance. 
Similarly, the cues used by Western observers to infer aggressiveness, extroversion, social 
skills, and trustworthiness, elicit weaker trait judgements in East Asian observers (Walker et 
al., 2011). Interestingly, East Asian observers are also slower to make trait inferences from 
faces, perhaps because trait representations are a less salient aspect of personality 
understanding in these cultures (Walker et al., 2011).  
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Third, we appear to base trait inferences on aspects of facial appearance originating in recent 
human history. For example, research suggests that individuals who wear glasses are 
perceived to be more intelligent, industrious, dependable, and trustworthy (Hellström & 
Tekle, 1994; Manz & Lueck, 1968; Thornton, 1944). This connection has at times taken on 
enormous cultural significance. For example, the Khmer Rouge targeted individuals with 
glasses as they were believed to be a sign of intellectualism (Ung & McElroy, 2011). 
Similarly, individuals who have tattoos on their face or neck are perceived as untrustworthy 
(Timming & Perrett, 2016) and more likely to be judged guilty in criminal justice settings 
(Funk & Todorov, 2013; Todorov, 2017), and individuals with facial piercings are seen as 
less employable, particularly in client facing roles (Timming, Nickson, Re, & Perrett, 2015). 
As recent cultural creations, natural selection has not had an opportunity to alter the 
perceptual processing of glasses, tattoos, or piercings, or act on associated trait inferences. 
These mappings, therefore, must be acquired culturally.  
 
6. Resolving the consistency paradox  
Veridical relationships have been found between facial attributes and some trait-related 
behaviours (Bond, Berry, & Omar, 1994; Bonnefon et al., 2015; De Neys, Hopfensitz, & 
Bonnefon, 2015; Stirrat & Perrett, 2010; Zebrowitz, Voinescu, & Collins, 1996). Where 
veridical relationships exist – even ones that are relatively weak – consistent face-trait 
mappings will emerge provided children have sufficient exposure to these contingencies (e.g., 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). For other face-trait mappings, however, researchers have found 
no evidence of a veridical basis in reality (Olivola & Todorov, 2010; Todorov et al., 2015).  
At first glance, this appears to pose a challenge for our learning model because we have 
argued that face-trait mappings emerge only when a predictive relationship exists between 
representations in face space and trait space. Where facial appearance and trait-related 
behaviours are unrelated in the general population, consistent trait inferences appear to argue 
against our hypothesis. One might reasonably expect children raised in these environments to 
acquire no face-trait mappings, or acquire highly idiosyncratic mappings reflecting their 
unique face-trait experiences (Honekopp, 2006; Todorov, 2017). To the extent that there is 
consistency in these trait inferences, it appears paradoxical: How can a permissive learning 
framework yield (some) consistent face-trait mappings in environments that provide 
inconsistent face-trait experience?  
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We suggest that two factors may resolve this apparent paradox. First, we argue that cultural 
learning supports the emergence of consistent face-trait mappings. Second, we argue that 
innate physiological responses to certain facial cues may canalise (Waddington, 1942) the 
emergence of particular face-trait mappings.  
 
6.1 Cultural induction and reinforcement 
Our day-to-day interactions with others may be a relatively poor source of correlated face-
trait experience. However, various cultural instruments expose us to strong contingencies 
between facial appearance and character traits (Figure 3a). For many centuries, fairy tales 
have presented archetypal characters (Bottigheimer, 2009; Warner, 1995) that may help 
children develop a rudimentary trait space. Since industrialization, these character 
descriptions have frequently been accompanied by visual illustrations of the characters’ 
appearance. Regularities in these illustrations may effectively ‘teach’ children that people 
with particular traits (heroism, bravery) have a certain visual appearance (square jaw, 
blemish-free skin). More recently, the stereotypical depiction of heroes, heroines and villains 
in animated films (e.g., Disney and Pixar) and in comic book art has also been widely noted 
(England, Descartes, & Collier-Meek, 2011; Gillam & Wooden, 2008; Reynolds, 1992). 
Stereotypical trait illustrations of character are not restricted to children’s stories. For 
example, the depiction of Santa Claus may contribute to the impression that portly, round 
faced men with white facial hair are jovial and kind in several Westerns cultures (Belk, 
1987). Similarly, the typecasting of feature-film actors may serve as a rich source of 
correlated face-trait experience (Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Von Rittmann, 2003). 
 
Some of the cultural devices that transmit face-trait mappings are relatively modern (e.g., 
animations, television, and film). Others, however, have been around much longer. For 
example, there are interesting differences between the depiction of the virtuous and the 
unworthy in many forms of religious iconography (Morgan, 1997). In other cultural contexts, 
the use of masks to depict facial traits is an age-old tradition (Pernet, 1992). In the masks 
made by the Dan people of West Africa, for example, narrow eyes and an oval face are used 
to depict mild mannered traits, whereas large and protruding eyes are used to depict vigorous 
and aggressive individuals (Fischer, 1967; Jȩdrej, 1986). Interestingly, these cultural 
instruments potentially reinforce different face-trait mappings to Western cultures in which 
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large eyes are often used to depict trustworthiness (Zebrowitz, Fellous, Mignault, & 
Andreoletti, 2003).  
 
While some cultural devices may reinforce trait stereotypes inadvertently, other devices are 
explicitly designed to foster particular face-trait mappings. Propaganda provides an example 
of this type of cultural device. For instance, fear of cheap immigrant labour from China 
prompted a spate of anti-Chinese propaganda in California in the 1870s (Figure 3b). These 
images intentionally foster mappings between East Asian facial features and negative traits 
(e.g. aggression, deceitfulness).  
 
Figure-3 
 
Once particular face-trait mappings are established, they can easily spread both within and 
between generations through cultural learning. We hypothesise that because adults are 
reliable in their judgements of who appears trustworthy and untrustworthy, children will be 
exposed to consistent differences in how caregivers and other individuals respond to 
unfamiliar individuals who vary in their facial appearance. Caregivers may explicitly warn 
their children to avoid individuals with particular facial features; for example, making 
reference to apparent untrustworthiness.  
 
Caregivers’ responses to particular facial features may also leak into their non-verbal 
behaviour in a way that children can detect and learn from (Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 
2009). Research on social referencing has shown that young children are extremely sensitive 
to other people’s non-verbal behaviour and that they use their nonverbal responses to learn 
vicariously about the world. For example, infants are reluctant to approach a stranger unless 
their mother has interacted with them positively (Fein, 1975). We speculate that this form of 
learning may, therefore, produce face-trait mappings quite early in development.  This 
tendency to rely on others’ nonverbal responses persists throughout childhood. Preschool 
children acquire negative attitudes towards strangers after observing people interact with 
them in a negative way (Castelli, De Dea, & Nesdale, 2008; Skinner, Meltzoff, & Olson, 
2016). Other research has shown that from the age of 4, children are sensitive to non-verbal 
displays of dominance and status (Over & Carpenter, 2015). To the extent that adults respond 
to individuals who appear dominant with consistent non-verbal responses (Tiedens & 
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Fragale, 2003), observing third party interaction will provide children with an opportunity to 
learn face-trait mappings about dominance.  
  
6.2 Canalisation through physiological states   
It is widely thought that certain facial features elicit physiological states in observers. For 
example, so-called ‘infant schema’ appears to elicit positive feelings and may encourage 
nurturing and approach-related behaviours (Glocker et al., 2009). Similarly, facial 
disfigurements elicit aversion responses (Ryan, Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2012), and 
attractive faces may elicit sexual arousal (Rhodes, 2006). To some degree these stimulus-
response (S-R) mappings may be hardwired and conserved across species (Glocker et al., 
2009; Rhodes, 2006; Ryan et al., 2012). Crucially, we argue that conserved S-R behaviours 
do not constitute a trait inference per se. Conceptually similar “fight or flight” responses can 
be elicited by other types of visual stimulus – including  spiders (Rakison & Derringer, 2008) 
and snakes (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008) – to which we do not typically ascribe traits. 
Moreover, innate S-R behaviours can be seen in a host of species seemingly incapable of 
meaningful trait inferences (Lorenz, 1943; Shibasaki & Kawai, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, there is overwhelming evidence that physiological states (e.g. arousal, emotion) 
alter human decision making (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015; Phelps, Lempert, & 
Sokol-Hessner, 2014). We speculate that these states bias explicit reasoning about strangers’ 
traits (see Section 4.3). For example, when locating strangers in trait space via the controlled 
route, the induction of positive affect in observers may shift the criterion for positive 
evaluation. Frequently when observing the behaviours of strangers, their intentions and 
motivations are ambiguous. Beautiful faces and infantile facial features may elicit positive 
feelings in the observer that promote a favourable interpretation of ambiguous behaviours – 
in these situations we may be inclined to give strangers the benefit of the doubt. 
Consequently, observers may more likely to map beautiful and infantile faces to positively 
valenced traits (e.g. trustworthiness).   
 
 
 
6.3 The importance of studying developmental trajectories 
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The vast majority of research on spontaneous first impressions has been conducted with 
adults. More recently, however, developmental psychologists have become interested in this 
topic (Cogsdill et al., 2014; Jessen & Grossmann, 2016, 2017). We believe that this work 
may prove to be revealing with respect to the mechanisms underlying consistent trait 
inferences. Specifically, we hypothesize that the face-trait contingencies we experience early 
in development might be particularly influential. Correlated face-trait experiences in 
childhood (including caregivers’ reactions to strangers and cultural devices designed to teach 
children about heroes and villains) may induce consistent face-trait mappings that are hard to 
‘unlearn’ later in life.  
 
The importance of studying trait inferences across the lifespan can be illustrated with work 
from the associative learning tradition. In renewal paradigms, participants first learn that a 
stimulus predicts one outcome (e.g. a reward). They are then transferred to another context 
where they learn that the same stimulus no longer predicts that outcome (e.g., it may instead 
predict no outcome or the delivery of an aversive stimulus). Crucially, however, when 
returned to the original context or transferred to a novel context, subjects once again expect 
the stimulus to signal reward (Bouton & King, 1983; Nelson, Sanjuan, Vadillo-Ruiz, Pérez, 
& León, 2011; Peck & Bouton, 1990). Results such as these suggest that second-learned 
contingencies do not overwrite the associations first acquired by a stimulus; rather, second-
learned contingencies exist in parallel, but only manifest in particular contexts (also see 
'spontaneous recovery'; e.g., Rescorla, 2004). Insights from this area have previously been 
used to explain behaviour in a range of contexts including relapse of addicts (Bouton, 1994, 
2002). In relation to first impressions, this work suggests that first-learned face-trait 
mappings acquired early in development may endure and continue to generalise to novel 
contexts throughout the individual’s lifetime. In contrast, face-trait mappings acquired later in 
life may tend to affect behaviour in particular contexts.  
 
More generally, development is an inherently recursive process in which early experiences 
can set in motion patterns of learning that affect later outcomes (Heckman, 2006; Master & 
Walton, 2013). Previous developmental research on the origins of intergroup divisions has 
shown that expectations about other people are self-reinforcing in at least two important 
respects.  First, expectations can bias the interpretation of ambiguous situations such that the 
behaviour of disliked individuals is more likely to be interpreted in a negative way (Sagar & 
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Schofield, 1980). Second, memory for social information is biased such that behaviour that 
conforms to initial expectations is more likely to be remembered (Baron & Dunham, 2015; 
Liben & Signorella, 1980). Thus, we predict that children may be more likely to remember 
behaviours in which individuals who appear to be untrustworthy act in an untrustworthy way, 
reinforcing early face-trait mappings.  
 
7. The role of facial emotion cues 
Perceived emotion cues are thought to contribute to spontaneous trait inferences, most 
notably trustworthiness (Montepare & Dobish, 2003; Todorov et al., 2015; Todorov et al., 
2008). When meeting a stranger, it is not always easy to distinguish their permanent facial 
features from their transient facial expressions; whether someone is scowling or simply has 
narrow eyes. According to the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis (e.g., Todorov, 2017; 
Zebrowitz & Zhang, 2011), permanent facial features which resemble subtle facial emotions 
may provoke inferences in line with those provoked by the corresponding emotional 
expression. Thus, someone with narrow eyes might be judged untrustworthy because 
misperceived facial anger is threatening cue. Consistent with this view, observers with 
impaired emotion recognition show atypical judgements of trustworthiness (Brewer, Collins, 
Cook, & Bird, 2015; Sprengelmeyer et al., 2016). Explaining the consistency between 
observers in these judgements is relatively easy. Insofar as the ability to recognise and 
interpret so-called ‘basic emotions’ is widespread across the globe (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002; Russell, 1994), one would expect observers in many cultures to derive similar 
judgements from the presence of perceived emotion.  
 
While the emotion overgeneralisation hypothesis offers an account of some of the cues used 
to infer the traits of others – the input into the system – the nature of the inferential process 
remains opaque. The TIM framework offers a means by which to delineate the potential 
mechanisms. First, trait judgements derived from facial emotion may be products of explicit 
reasoning (the ‘controlled route’).  When asked about the traits of the to-be-judged 
individual, observers may extrapolate from the current perceived emotional state of the 
target. In the absence of any other information, one might reason that someone who is 
smiling in the current stimulus image is likely to be cheerful or kind in general (Sutherland et 
al., 2013). Alternatively, trait judgements derived from facial emotion could be mediated by 
mappings between face and trait space (the ‘automatic route’). Countless cultural devices 
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teach us that traits and facial expression co-vary; for example, picture books frequently use 
facial expressions to illustrate the character of protagonists (Nikolajeva & Scott, 2006). 
Exposure to material of this nature may encourage mappings between regions of face space 
encompassing expression variation and points in trait space. Moreover, the observation of 
facial affect may induce physiological states in observers that helps canalise the emergence of 
particular face-trait mappings (see Section 6.2). For example, the detection of facial anger 
may bias how observers interpret the behaviour of strangers, and thereby encourage 
mappings between facial anger and negative traits (e.g., untrustworthiness).  
 
It is important to note that evidence suggesting trustworthiness judgements are reliable after 
brief stimulus presentations (Todorov et al., 2009; Willis & Todorov, 2006) does not show 
the automaticity of the trait inference per se. Rather, it may indicate that the cues on which 
judgements are based are available quickly. It is well known that facial emotion competes 
effectively for early visual processing resources; for example, emotional faces are harder to 
mask from conscious awareness, relative to emotionally neutral faces (Jiang & He, 2006; 
Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007).  
 
8. Predictions and falsification 
To be of value, psychological theories must make novel, testable predictions and be 
falsifiable. As we have discussed throughout this paper, the TIM framework makes a number 
of interesting empirical predictions for future research. Some of these predictions we have 
also highlighted in the table. In the remainder of Section 8, we wish to consider in more detail 
three complementary empirical approaches that have the potential to falsify the key tenet of 
our model; that the face-trait mappings responsible for automatic trait inferences are products 
of the environments in which we are raised. 
 
Table 
 
Developmental data demonstrating that young infants make behavioural predictions about 
individuals whose faces vary in apparent trustworthiness, dominance, competence, etc., 
would challenge the view that all mappings between face space and trait space are acquired 
through experience. Such a finding would be particularly striking if it were in a sample of 
infants too young to have had extensive opportunities to learn about other individuals through 
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social referencing. In order to provide a convincing falsification of our framework, it would 
be necessary to distinguish behavioural products of nascent trait inferences from simple 
reactions to expressions of emotion. Several previous studies have reported precocious 
inference of facial trustworthiness by infants and young children (Cogsdill et al., 2014; Jessen 
& Grossmann, 2016, 2017). In each of these studies, however, facial trustworthiness is 
confounded with subtle yet perceptible differences in emotional expression. Consequently, 
apparent evidence of precocious inference of trustworthiness may simply reflect the fact that 
infants can detect and recognise subtle facial emotions. For example, the finding that infants 
preferentially look towards a face that adults would label as trustworthy (Jessen & 
Grossmann, 2016) may simply indicate that infants can detect subtle smile cues and 
experience feelings of reward as a result (Kuchuk, Vibbert, & Bornstein, 1986). In this 
context, we note that animals not typically thought to engage in trait inferences (sheep) show 
reliable preferences for smiling human faces over angry faces (Tate, Fischer, Leigh, & 
Kendrick, 2006).  
 
Twin studies offer a second means by which the central claim of the TIM framework could 
be falsified. TIM predicts that there ought to be similar concordance between the face-trait 
mappings of identical (MZ) and fraternal (DZ) twins where both siblings have been raised in 
the same environment. If, however, the cognitive architecture necessary for making trait 
inferences from faces is genetically specified, then the trait inferences of MZ twins should 
show greater similarity to each other than do those of DZ twins. Offering some support for 
our position, we note that related empirical work has shown that judgments of facial 
attractiveness are influenced more strongly by the environment than by genes (Germine et al., 
2015). Importantly, to demonstrate that face-trait mappings have an innate basis, authors 
would need to demonstrate that greater concordance between MZ twins, where observed, was 
not the result of genetic differences in the processing of faces – including the perception of 
facial emotion cues – or traits more generally. Face perception ability is known to be a 
heritable trait (Shakeshaft & Plomin, 2015; Wilmer et al., 2010; Zhu et al., 2010). In a similar 
way, genetic influences likely affect individuals’ ability to learn about the traits of others. By 
shaping the development of face space and trait space independently, genetic factors may 
conceivably increase the concordance in facial trait judgements of MZ twins without acting 
on face-trait mappings per se.   
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Finally, cross-cultural research will provide an important test of the TIM framework. Many 
trait inferences may be broadly similar across cultures.  For example, one would expect 
observers in many cultures to derive similar judgements from explicit reasoning about 
perceived emotion cues (see Section 7). Similarly, the physiological states induced by facial 
beauty, facial disfigurement, and facial affect, may canalise similar face-trait mappings in 
observers around the world (see Section 6.2). Crucially, however, TIM predicts that many of 
the spontaneous trait inferences made by observers will differ across cultures (e.g., 
intelligence, competence). Furthermore, TIM makes a specific prediction about the nature of 
these cross-cultural differences; namely that, where differences are observed, these 
differences ought to be closely related the available cultural input.  To offer one example, in 
cultures where Santa Claus is a prominent cultural figure, cues such as a white beard, a round 
face and an elderly appearance ought to be more strongly associated with traits such as 
trustworthiness and generosity than in cultures where this cultural association is less 
common. Evidence that trait inferences are insensitive to variability in environmental input 
would therefore challenge a key prediction of the TIM framework.  
 
9. Implications and concluding thoughts 
In the present paper, we have outlined a novel account of the origins of first impressions from 
faces. Our TIM framework asserts that trait inferences from faces result from face-trait 
mappings, acquired during ontogeny, that permit excitation of face representations to 
propagate automatically to trait representations. In describing our model, we presented 
evidence that the development of face space (Section 4.1) and trait space (Section 4.2) are 
both subject to considerable environmental control. We then argued that mappings between 
locations within these representation spaces emerge as a result of correlated face-trait 
experience (Section 4.3), and cite preliminary findings consistent with this view (Section 5). 
Contrary to existing ideas about the origins of trait judgements (Section 3), we propose a 
limited role for innate factors and natural selection in the induction of face-trait mappings. 
Our model explains inter-observer consistency by appealing to cultural learning (Section 6.1) 
and by citing physiological responses elicited by particular types of stimuli that canalise 
certain face-trait mappings (Section 6.2). Finally, we discussed how emotion cues may 
support trait inferences within the TIM framework (Section 7), before considering the 
predictions and falsification of the model (Section 8).  
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To date, much of the literature on first impressions has focussed on the traits inferred from 
faces. Indeed, within this literature authors frequently adopt a narrow definition of “facial 
cue” focussing on the internal features of faces, and disregarding the contribution of other 
cues (e.g., hairstyle, facial hair, hairstyle, glasses, tattoos, jewellery, and piercings). An 
important feature of the TIM framework is its ability to explain a wide range of trait 
inferences.  If trait inferences from faces are learned, then any aspect of facial appearance 
can, in principle, become associated with particular trait representation. For example, our 
model can easily be extended to explain why wearing glasses is associated with inferences 
about intelligence (Hellström & Tekle, 1994; Manz & Lueck, 1968; Thornton, 1944) and 
why facial tattoos are associated with inferences about criminality (Funk & Todorov, 2013; 
Timming & Perrett, 2016). Indeed, our framework could be developed further to explain trait 
inferences from body shape (Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Vartanian & Silverstein, 2013), 
walking gait (Koppensteiner, Stephan, & Jäschke, 2016; Thoresen, Vuong, & Atkinson, 
2012), and vocal cues (McAleer, Todorov, & Belin, 2014; Rezlescu et al., 2015). In each of 
these domains, we speculate that visual representations may come to excite locations in a 
common trait space by virtue of acquired mappings comparable to those hypothesised for 
faces.  
 
TIM offers a single unifying framework within which automatic trait inferences from social 
perception cues may be understood. In contrast, the view that trait inferences from faces are 
mediated by an innate mechanism that conferred an evolutionary advantage on our ancestors 
(Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Van Vugt & Grabo, 2015; Zebrowitz, 2004; Zebrowitz & 
Zhang, 2011) cannot explain trait inferences from modern artefacts (glasses, piercings) and 
fashions (tattoos, contemporary hairstyles) as these cues simply emerged too recently in 
human history to have been influenced by natural selection. The fact that observers make 
consistent trait inferences from features not in the evolutionary environment (e.g. glasses, 
make-up, tattoos) underscores the plausibility of a learning account; these examples are 
positive evidence for the role of learning in the acquisition of face-trait mappings. Such 
observations represent a proof of sufficiency; evidently it is possible to explain all trait 
inferences – both idiosyncratic and normative – by appealing to learning. Once one accepts 
that some of the normative inferences are products of learning, the question becomes: is it 
necessary to posit any innate face-trait mappings? These findings shift the onus back to 
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proponents of more strongly nativist accounts to defend their assertion that some mappings 
are innate.  
 
Finally, TIM has important practical implications. The influence of first impressions on our 
choices and behaviours has been well-documented; for example, research has shown that 
face-trait mappings influence employment opportunities (Olivola, Eubanks et al., 2014), 
voting patterns (Ballew & Todorov, 2007), and sentencing decisions (Funk & Todorov, 2013; 
Wilson & Rule, 2015). As a result, associations between appearance and perceived traits may 
contribute to systematic societal injustice (Devine, 1989). If these judgements are inflexible, 
then the scope for intervention is limited; relatively little may be done beyond increasing 
awareness and informing people about the dangers of relying first impressions (Olivola, Funk 
et al., 2014). However, if trait inferences are shaped by cultural learning, then it may be 
possible to mitigate widely held but deleterious societal beliefs through modifying the 
available cultural input.  
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Unfamiliar faces can vary significantly in the extent to which they are perceived trustworthy (top) or 
untrustworthy (bottom).   
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: Learning trait mappings de novo. (a) When a stranger is encountered, the observer is able to represent 
their face as a vector in face space. (b) Having learned about the stranger’s behaviours, the observer can reason 
about the stranger’s traits, thereby placing them in trait space. (c) Where excitation of representations in face 
space predicts the nature of representations in trait space over time, a face-trait mapping emerges.   
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: Cultural induction of face-trait mappings. (a) Several cultural devices may foster face-trait mapping 
inadvertently. (b) Other cultural devices may foster particular face-trait mappings intentionally. For example, 
Anti-Chinese propaganda produced in California during the 1870s deliberately fostered mappings between East 
Asian facial features and negative traits.  
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Table: Directions for future empirical studies suggested by the TIM framework 
Claim made by TIM Prediction for future empirical research	
First impressions are learned culturally 
(Section 5; Section 6.1; Section 8; 
Section 9). 
Some spontaneous trait inferences will differ across 
cultures. The specific nature of observed cultural 
differences will be predictable from the nature of the 
available cultural input. 
 
First impressions may change and evolve over time. 
For example, pale skin became associated with high 
status and sophistication in Elizabethan England. 
 
 It will be possible to train novel face-trait mappings 
within lab-based situations. 
 
 Caregivers will encourage and reinforce particular 
face-trait mappings (whether consciously or 
unconsciously) in interactions with their children.  
 
Face-trait mappings are products of 
domain-general associative processes, 
such as those revealed through the 
study of conditioning phenomena 
(Section 4.4; Section 6.3). 
 
The rate of associative learning is known to be 
determined by both temporal contiguity (the number 
of times A and B are paired together) and 
contingency (the strength of the predictive 
relationship between A and B). The acquisition of 
face-trait mappings will, therefore, be related to the 
number of times we encounter face-trait pairings, 
but also how often we encounter exceptions to the 
to-be-learned relationship.  
 
 The study of conditioning phenomena has revealed 
that learned responses can be subject to contextual 
control; associations can manifest in one context but 
not in others. Should the acquisition of face-trait 
mappings conform to the same principles of 
associative learning, then the same face may 
produce different trait inferences when encountered 
in different contexts. 
 
Trait space is independent of face 
space (Section 4.2; Section 9). 
Facial cues and other appearances cues (such as 
body shape, walking gait, hairstyle clothing) will 
activate representations in a common trait space. It 
may be possible to identify these overlapping neural 
codes with neuroimaging. 
 
There are two routes (automatic, 
controlled) for deriving trait 
judgements from faces (Section 4.3). 
Individuals may exist who are capable of making 
one type of inference, but not the other. For 
example, neuropsychological patients may exist 
who are incapable of flexible reasoning about the 
traits of others from thin slices of behaviour but who 
continue to exhibit automatic inferences acquired 
before their injury. 
 
